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Forthcoming in European Political Science 
 
bourdieu-in-the-making: 
on the state and the craft of reflexive sociology 
 
inanna hamati-ataya 
aberystwyth university 
 
 
On the State* is the latest of Pierre Bourdieu’s posthumous publications to 
appear in English, following the release in January 2012 of the original French 
version, Sur l’État, in conjunction with a series of public colloquia marking the 
10th anniversary of his passing. The volume is composed of the twenty-three 
lectures Bourdieu gave at the Collège de France over academic years 1989-90, 
1990-91, and 1991-92, and presents his first explicit and extensive engagement 
with the classical problem of ‘the state’ – a term he had very consciously 
avoided for over two decades. Using ‘a mixture of manuscript notes, extracts 
from special presentations and marginal notes on books and photocopies’, 
editors Champagne, Lenoir, Poupeau, and Rivière succeeded in turning this 
‘lattice of written texts, oral commentaries and more or less improvised 
reflections’ (p. xi) into a dynamic collection of essays that offers the reader a 
unique insight into Bourdieu’s thought and practice. Indeed this book is not 
simply about a classical object of political theory. It is equally about 
sociological thinking and doing, and their intimate relation to the political.  
 
THINKING THE STATE: 
SOCIAL OBSTACLES AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES 
 
Bourdieu’s reflexive epistemology explicitly informs his approach to what he 
admits is the most challenging social object he has ever had to confront. Faithful 
to the Bachelardian posture he contributed to developing throughout his career, 
Bourdieu inaugurates his lectures with a methodical reflection on the prenotions 
and other epistemological obstacles that hinder the researcher’s objective 
understanding of the state as a social reality. The greatest challenge to 
sociological inquiry is the fact that the social world produces and legitimates 
not only its objects but also the very categories and instruments we use to 
perceive and understand them. The epistemological vigilance that should 
therefore systematically guide any sociological investigation is even more 
necessary when addressing ‘the state’, which is ‘that which founds the logical 
conformity and moral conformity of the social world, and in this way, the 
fundamental consensus on the meaning of the social world’ (p. 4). As a 
consequence of this, ‘our thinking, the very structures of consciousness by 
which we construct the social world and the particular object that is the state, 
are very likely the product of the state itself’ (p. 3).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Pierre Bourdieu (2014) On the State. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1989-1992. Edited by 
Patrick Champagne, Remi Lenoir, Franck Poupeau, Marie-Christine Rivière. Translated by David 
Fernbach. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
	   2 
What makes the state especially difficult to grasp objectively, that is, to 
‘conquer’ as a properly sociological object, is that it is a successful fiction: a 
‘well-founded illusion’ (p. 12) (as Durkheim had described religion), which, like 
all social institutions, exists ‘in things and in minds’ (p. 115), that is, both 
objectively through its material manifestations and subjectively in individual 
and collective mental structures and representations. For Bourdieu the latter 
dimension is crucial to understand the nature of the state and its cognitive 
effects: the Weberian definition of the state that exclusively singles out its 
successful ‘monopoly of legitimate physical violence’ is incomplete, insofar as 
that monopoly is accompanied, and even conditioned, by the state’s successful 
monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence (p. 4). Sociologists therefore need to 
operate an epistemological break with the cognitive categories of social 
representation that the state imposes through its symbolic power – and this de 
facto puts them in competition with the state’s authority to impose the 
categories through which social reality is constructed (more on this later). 
A great part of On the State is dedicated to explaining and addressing the 
many conceptual and practical aspects of this epistemological problem, and this 
is a very important, didactic dimension of the book. Indeed one of the 
unfortunate consequences of the incorporation of Bourdieu’s sociology into the 
curricular canon is a distortive tendency to focus disproportionately on his 
theoretical contributions and conclusions at the expense of his empirical 
investigations and methodology, and of a proper appreciation of how theory 
and empirics are articulated in his work. The great value of On the State is that 
it puts centre-stage Bourdieu’s modus operandi, wherein his detailed empirical 
inquiries and his reflexive epistemological concerns are constantly brought to 
bear on each other and on his conceptual framework and theoretical analyses. 
In this instance, Bourdieu deploys and simultaneously theorizes a range of 
epistemic and methodological strategies whose purpose is to allow an 
objectivation of the state that is independent of the categories of understanding 
and of judgment that the state imposes through its physical and symbolic power.  
The most basic step of this process is to emancipate our thought from the 
subjectivation of the state, which is the product of the successful (i.e. 
performative) acts of jurists and legal theoreticians who have gradually brought 
the state into existence as a legal fiction, a juridical subject (p. 55). This fiction is 
successful in that it is accepted by both public and scholarly thought and 
discourse, which thereby perpetuate it doxically, that is, through a form of 
collective belief that, unlike religious belief, operates below the level of 
conscious ‘recognition’ (reconnaissance) and is hence ‘misrecognized’ as such.  
This delineates important methodological paths for a sociology of the 
state. The first obvious move that follows from the de-reification of the state’s 
fictional subject-status is to start conceptualising and studying the state properly 
as ‘a [social] field’, that is, as ‘a space structured according to oppositions linked 
to specific forms of capital with differing interests’ (p. 20). These oppositions 
result from ‘the division of organizational functions associated with the different 
respective bodies’ that constitute it, such as the ministries and other institutions 
of the bureaucratic field, each of which has its own specific history and specific 
professional interests bound up with specific social positions. As long as one 
speaks of ‘the state’ as a single agent, as the instrument of the hegemony of a 
single social group, or as the site of a pre-defined social struggle (e.g. class 
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struggle), it is impossible to understand where the state comes from, what it 
does, and how it operates.  
Bourdieu’s first lecture is partly dedicated to explaining how he 
‘encountered the state’ indirectly while investigating the single-house market 
and the shift of national housing policies in France (a study published as The 
Social Structures of the Economy), which led him to focus on the ordinary 
functioning of the bureaucratic field, such as the establishment and operations 
of a state housing commission. The lessons from a ‘tangential’ focus on such 
trivial and mundane components of ‘the state’ is then critically assessed and 
developed into a systematic methodological procedure that is meant to avoid 
the pitfalls of grand philosophical theorizing that typically succumbs to the 
‘theory effects’ of successful social constructions. 
The centrality of the state’s symbolic dimension, on the other hand, calls 
for a focus on the fundamental categories of perception and classification that 
make the social order possible and that simultaneously order and regulate 
individual and collective thinking, being, and doing within it. In a direct 
filiation with the French sociological tradition of Durkheim, Mauss, and 
Halbwachs, Bourdieu highlights the importance of investigating the social 
origins and structures (les cadres sociaux) of such general, taken-for-granted 
ideational categories and frameworks. In the specific case of a sociology of the 
state, this entails studying, among others, the relation between private and 
public time (‘I don’t know any anarchist who does not change his clock when 
we go over to summer time’ (p. 8)); how collective memory, perceptions, and 
behaviour are ‘ruled’ (réglés) through state-imposed calendars, school 
schedules, commemorations, and rituals; and of course the structures of spatial 
organisation that are (re)produced through the teaching of national geography. 
To understand the state, then, is to understand how this successful, 
fictional subject has come to impose itself in our deepest mental categories as 
the author and guarantor of the universal and the public against the particular, 
the private, and the domestic. Or, to put it differently, the ‘puzzle’ facing the 
sociologist is not why people might decide to disobey or oppose the state – such 
a problematization succumbs to a ‘doxic experience of the social world’ by 
assuming the state to be socially and sociologically ‘evident’. The puzzle, 
rather, is why they do obey it in the first place. Contra philosophical and 
normative discussions of the ‘public space’ that ignore its history and the 
conditions of its possibility and legitimacy (e.g. Habermas’s), Bourdieu’s core 
methodological strategy, following Norbert Elias, is the sociogenetic approach, 
which is not a (Foucauldian) genealogy and does not aim to produce a theory of 
the (birth of the) state but rather a ‘model of the logic of its genesis’ (p. 191). 
This he pursues according to what he calls genetic structuralism, which ‘has to 
establish the specific logic of the genesis of bureaucratic logic, and 
simultaneously to describe the specific nature of this logic’ (see pp. 86-93). 
Genetic structuralism is, then, Bourdieu’s response to the dual 
epistemological challenge posed by the successful social construction of the 
state both as a non-problem – the result of a collective amnesia regarding its 
genesis and contentious origins – and as an efficient illusion – the result of a 
collective misrecognition (méconnaissance) of its fictional nature and symbolic 
power. Departing from Durkheim’s rationale according to which an 
understanding of social structures requires a return to ‘the elementary’ (which 
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Durkheim sought in ‘the primitive’ through anthropological inquiry), Bourdieu’s 
genetic approach rather aims at capturing ‘l’originaire’: ‘the original’ not in the 
sense of the unique, but of that which pertains to the origins: ‘the original is the 
place where a certain number of things are formed, things that, once formed, 
pass unnoticed. The original is the site of the essential, the site where struggles 
are visible, since resistances to the constitution of the state were very important’ 
(p. 89). 
Conceptually and methodologically, genetic structuralism is also meant 
to avoid the problem faced by comparative history/sociology, namely, that of 
inducing (and assuming) common characteristics among all historical states (p. 
38). How then, to study the history of the state without falling into any faulty 
universalist or reductionist assumptions? Bourdieu asserts that ‘[i]t is possible to 
study a particular case – or a small number of particular cases – in such a way 
that your project is to grasp the universal forms of state in it, the logic of the 
genesis of a logic’ (pp. 86-7). For this reason, ‘it seems to [him] doubly justified 
to take as the central object the cases of France and England [while constantly 
comparing them to others, especially Japan], treated explicitly as particular 
cases of a universe of possible cases, as privileged particular cases, because 
historically, what was invented [t]here served as a model for all other forms of 
the modern state.’ (p. 87). The corollary of the historical status as modern 
‘models’ that France and England enjoy is that their own genesis is autonomous 
from that of others. In other words, they are not taken to be universally 
representative of the genesis of all states, but rather so distinctively delineated 
socio-historically that a structurogenetic approach can produce important 
insights as to the logic of their constitutive logic. 
 
SOCIOGENESIS OF THE STATE: 
THE UNIVERSAL AND THE MONOPOLY OF ITS MONOPOLY 
 
According to Bourdieu, the logic of the emergence of the modern European 
state is that of the accumulation, concentration, and transmutation of different 
kinds of capital – ‘economic, physical force, symbolic, cultural or informational’ 
(p. 186) – through a dual process of monopolization and universalization. This 
process whereby private capital is accumulated, centralized, and transformed 
into public capital simultaneously generates a kind of ‘meta-capital’ and thereby 
gradually establishes the state as a ‘meta-field’ of the ‘field of power’. The latter 
had already been defined by Bourdieu as the field wherein the exchange rate 
between different species of capital is the object of a constant social struggle 
among capital holders, but now Bourdieu specifies the relationship between it 
and the state – ‘[o]ne of the unifying principles of the field of power is that those 
people who belong to it struggle for power over the state, for this capital that 
gives power over the preservation and reproduction of the different species of 
capital’ (198; see also p. 311). The Lecture of 21 February 1991 sketches the 
basic steps of Bourdieu’s analysis of the genesis of the modern state (pp.190-
195) and its transformation into this ‘power over powers’, that he covers 
extensively in the following lectures: 
1) The formula ‘concentration = universalization + monopolization’ 
reflects the dual process at work in the accumulation of capital in the hands of 
what gradually becomes the state: on the one hand, the recognition of the 
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legitimacy of the different species of capital (and hence of the autonomy of their 
specific, differentiated social fields: the economy, the law, culture…) and on the 
other, the dispossession of capital holders of their respective monopolies. 
Bourdieu thus demonstrates that the success of the constitution of the state’s 
monopoly (of physical violence, taxation, etc.) requires its prior successful 
accumulation of symbolic capital, without which it lacks the ‘legitimacy’ 
(Weber) that makes its ‘racketing’ (Tilly) acceptable to those it has deprived of 
their privileges and all the others now subjected to its authority. As a ‘meta-
field’, then, the state recognizes, unifies, and dispossesses – domination entails 
social integration, not exclusion. 
2) To bring forth the logic of the dynastic state (‘the original’) Bourdieu 
introduces the notion of ‘a system of strategies of [social] reproduction’ (235-
244) which he had previously analysed in relation to Bearn peasantry and state 
nobility in France, the concept of ‘strategy’ being understood in a habitus-
mediated, not rational-choice-theoretical sense. The dynastic state is a state in 
which these combined reproduction strategies (of fertility, succession, economic 
and social investment, education, or myth-making) ‘are the essential part of 
what this power does‘ (242), specifically because ‘[t]he state is merged with the 
king’s house’ and ‘political business is not separated from the domestic unit’ 
(245, 244).  
Through this prism, the well-known history of the European dynastic 
state is illuminated anew by a combined anthropological-sociological reading, 
which brings forth the interconnectedness of two opposite logics. On the one 
hand, dynastic state-practice leads to specific normative inventions (e.g. 
apanages, Salic law) that follow a properly ‘practical logic’ governed by the 
system of patrimonial reproduction strategies. On the other, dynastic strategies 
and inventions are theorized by legislators and jurists, who have an interest in 
such a rationalization that legitimates their own existence and social role. It is in 
this process of transformation of a practical logic into a normative logic that the 
private dynastic state is gradually replaced by the impersonal modern state. 
3) This move ‘from the king’s house to raison d’état’ is born of two 
contradictions that are intrinsic to the dynastic state. The first is that ‘the king 
expropriates private powers for the benefit of a private power’, and this can only 
be justified/legitimated if this expropriation is universalized beyond the person 
and case of the king. However, by universalizing the king’s particular case, 
jurists in effect ‘contribute to developing a discourse that is the very negation of 
what they legitimize, that is, that if it is necessary to de-privatize the private in 
order to legitimize it, this is because the non-private is better than the private’ 
(259). The second contradiction is the gradual coexistence of two antagonistic 
modes of social reproduction, namely, the domestic reproduction of the 
dynastic heirs on the basis of the family, blood, and nature, and the 
reproduction of state officials on the basis of the school system, merit, and 
competence.  
The opposition between heirs and clerks establishes a tripartite structure 
wherein the king uses clerks and heirs against each other and rules through, and 
above, their opposition. A division of the labour of social domination thereby 
develops that is grounded in the struggle between two different principles of 
autonomous authority, wherein the powerlessness of the reproducible is 
balanced by the non-reproducibility of the powerful (p. 261). It is, according to 
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Bourdieu, the contradiction between these two categories of agents that 
gradually erodes the domestic logic of the dynastic state and promotes the 
development of the bureaucratic state, through the increasing concentration of 
cultural and symbolic capital in the hands of the rising clerks, whose very 
gradually accumulated victories establish the distinction between public and 
private order. This process is accompanied by a series of interrelated 
transformations: the territory is unified, the different social fields are integrated 
and their rules codified (e.g. legal codes, orthography), the exercise of state 
power is depersonalized, and its procedures homogenized and rationalized (e.g. 
use of surveys, forms, and statistics). 
The modern state, then, is largely the product of those who, because of 
their specific capital and mode of reproduction, their professional habitus and 
social interests, created ‘the public’ and ‘the universal’, and produced an 
autonomous bureaucratic field that simultaneously produced them – these are 
the samurais in Japan, the nobles of the robe (jurists) in France. This analysis 
enables Bourdieu to address the relation between the two ordinary conceptions 
of the state, namely, the state as a group of people sharing a common identity 
over a unified territory and subject(ed) to the same sovereignty, and the state as 
the sovereign administration of this people on/and that territory. State-mediated 
thinking about the state, not least within democratic societies, is especially 
visible in the common perception that the former produces (and thereby 
justifies) the latter (pp. 32 and 196-197). The sociogenetic approach rather 
shows that it is not the existence of a naturally distinctive group sharing so-
called objective characteristics (a ‘nation’) that called for the development of an 
appropriate, impersonal apparatus of government to administer them 
sovereignly, but ‘the constitution of bureaucratic instances that are autonomous 
in relation to family, religion and economy that [was] the condition for the 
appearance of what is called the nation-state’ (p. 37). An important part of 
Bourdieu’s remaining lectures aims to further elaborate on the different aspects 
of this process, including the role of the school system in both the reproduction 
of bureaucrats and state-thinking, but also in the production of nationalism.  
 
SOCIOLOGY AND THE STATE: 
A STRUCTURAL RELATION 
 
Collège de France lectures provide a perfect setting to showcase the 
innovativeness of thinkers like Bourdieu, and this volume is filled with 
important commentaries, reflections, and hypotheses on both social reality and 
social science that are impossible to cover in this review. Of particular 
importance to readers interested in the philosophy and sociology of social 
science are Bourdieu’s comments on the socially maintained hierarchical 
relation between theory and empirics (pp. 23-24); the socially imposed frontiers 
among history, sociology, and anthropology (pp. 86-88), or their dysfunctional 
relation to epistemology (pp. 90-91) and philosophy (pp. 96, 340-341). More 
central to the object of this volume, however, are Bourdieu’s reflections on the 
relation of the social and historical sciences and humanities to the state itself. 
These can be organized into three main points. 
The first is that state nobility and jurists are not the only social groups 
that contribute to (re)producing the state by theorizing it. Intellectuals and 
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scholars play an important role in this process, especially political philosophers 
(pp. 269, 338), historians, and social scientists. Of special contemporary 
significance is the fact that the social sciences, and sociology especially, ‘have 
played a very important role in the construction of the state of mind and 
philosophy that led to the welfare state’ insofar as they were ‘built up against 
[the] philosophy of individualism’ and ‘connected with [its] dissolution’ (pp. 
363, 364). More generally, socio-political thought/theory is generated in 
political action and work, not independently of it. It should therefore be 
understood not as the theorization of a pre-existing reality, but as the ideational 
manifestation of practical positions within and about it – in other words, it is co-
constitutive of reality, and reflexive, critical sociology aims to bring to 
consciousness the erasure of this move from the logic of practice to the logic of 
logic.  
The second point has to do with the homology between the state and 
sociology. Much like sociology, the state is ‘a theoretical unifier, a theorist’; it 
involves ‘a rational knowledge of the social world’ and all its ‘techniques of 
objectivation’, of which statistics is the instrument par excellence (pp. 203, 213-
214). Insofar as it deals with social facts and humans ‘as things’, the state is in 
effect ‘Durkheimian avant la lettre’. But this homology between sociology and 
the state also places them in a competition with each other: sociology ‘makes a 
demonic claim quite analogous to that of the state, that of constructing the true 
view of the social world, more true than the official one… [It] thereby finds itself 
in the position of meta-state’ by ‘appropriating the monopoly of the construction 
of legitimate representation of the social world’ (p. 39). The sociologist, in other 
words, is the ‘meta-meta’ (p. 54). 
But this meta-position is simultaneously one of subjection and 
dependence, both materially and symbolically, vis-à-vis the state. Bourdieu has 
elsewhere described intellectuals as the dominated portion of the dominant 
class. Here, he highlights the ambivalence of a critical sociology carried out 
from within the institutions of the state and through the legitimating diplomas 
and legitimated social and symbolic status that the state confers on social 
scientists. A sociological lecture delivered from a Collège de France lectern is 
both a state-enabled and (potentially) state-defying act. It is in the interstices of 
this structural space simultaneously shaping the nature and potential of the 
social sciences that a reflexive sociology might aspire to turn its subversive 
ambitions into something more than the mere appropriation of a social 
monopoly. Bourdieu’s own socio-intellectual trajectory can be viewed as an 
attempt to embody this vocation and address its associated dilemmas. 
 
SOCIOLOGY-IN-THE-MAKING: 
A TRIBUTE 
 
A final word on the editorial work that was invested in this book is in order. 
Posthumous texts are peculiar and there are often legitimate reasons to be 
ambivalent about them. Alongside the curiosity or eagerness to discover them 
there is doubt as to their textual integrity and authorial legitimacy, especially 
when the author has not directly been involved in their preparation. With the 
exception of one chapter that Bourdieu personally proofread, On the State is 
explicitly a case wherein such concerns are highly exacerbated and reasonably 
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justified, the editors having consciously violated his principle of the separation 
of the written and spoken word, two different categories of discourse governed 
by different social conditions and rules of enunciation, transmission, and 
interpretation.  
Instead of editing the texts down, by removing the repetitions, 
digressions, and corrections that inevitably characterise the processes of 
research and oral pedagogical transmission; instead of offering the reader a 
depurated version of Bourdieu’s propositions that would reflect the cautiousness 
that had characterised his own editorial practice, the editors adopted the 
opposite strategy, namely, to present the reader with all the available material, 
painstakingly edited, organised, and complemented with the relevant references 
needed to guide us through Bourdieu’s spiralling but no less conclusive 
explorations – with all the natural overlaps, parentheses, doubts, imprecisions, 
awkwardness, gaps, and Freudian slips that these entail. The final product is a 
volume Bourdieu would certainly not have published, and is probably very 
different from the book he would have written. 
As a result of these bold editorial choices and of the tremendous work 
and dedication their implementation has required, On the State is a surprising 
gift, a reverence, and an act of love. It is difficult to imagine a text – not least 
one of such dense and consequential intellectual substance – that could better 
manifest and illustrate the ‘spirit’ and ethos of Pierre Bourdieu – his personality, 
his thought, his practice, and his very awareness of how they operated in the 
cognitive and social processes of sociological exploration and public 
communication. Because it showcases Bourdieusian epistemology in practice 
and in action so to speak, On the State is a beautiful, intelligent tribute to 
Bourdieu. Simultaneously, by allowing the full (theoretical and praxical) 
expression of Bourdieu’s reflexive science-in-the-making, the editors have also 
mediated Bourdieu’s own tribute to sociology – the underdog, the non-
glamorous, lowly science, the science of the everyday humble and mundane, 
here deployed, in all its earthly self-consciousness, on the jealously guarded turf 
of political philosophers.  
The slated publication of Bourdieu’s remaining Collège de France 
lectures, of which the lectures on Manet have already appeared in French, 
promises to further illustrate the critical, reflexive, and socially subversive 
insights such a sociology can offer to illuminate the many complex dimensions 
and dilemmas of our social and scholarly condition. 
 
*** 
 
